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Abstract: Critical infrastructures like our power generation facilities and water
supply form highly interconnected networks that are mutually dependent and any
failure can cascade through the network, resulting in devastating impact on
health, safety and the economy. These catastrophic events/disruptions can be
triggered by environmental accidents, geological/weather phenomena, disease
pandemics, etc. The disruptions can be caused/exacerbated by their being
unexpected, but they may actually be expected if relevant data have been
accounted for. To help account for and thereby anticipate such disruptions, one
way is to identify potential unforeseen interdependencies among infrastructure
components that can lead to extreme disruptions upon some failure in the
network. This paper shows how a simulation model for cascading failures and a
risk analysis/optimization approach can be applied to search for unforeseen
interdependencies and failure points that give rise to the highest risk in a network.
Key words : Unforeseen interdependencies; Vulnerabilities; Risk analysis;
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I.

Introduction

Critical infrastructure refers to the assets, systems and networks comprising identifiable
industries, institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of goods and
services essential to the functioning of the economy, the government at various levels, and
society as a whole1. Examples of critical infrastructure include facilities for energy/power
generation, water supply, telecommunications, transportation, banking/financial services,
security and health services, etc.2. They are highly interconnected and mutually dependent in
complex ways, and the sudden unavailability of any of them or part thereof may cause loss of
life, severe impact on health, safety or the economy3,4,5. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Indian
Ocean tsunami of December 2004, the Hurricane Katrina devastation of the US Gulf Coast in
2005, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake/tsunami and the severe
flooding in Thailand late 2011 can be considered examples of such major
disruptions/disasters.
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Within a single sector of critical infrastructure (e.g. the electric grid), as well as among
various mixed-type or multiple-sector infrastructure (e.g. electric grid and water supply), the
interdependencies among their various components can be highly complex and can be
quantitative or qualitative in character. Compounding the challenge of analyzing these
interrelationships is that access to the required information is difficult because a vast majority
of infrastructure assets are owned by the private sector and there are significant barriers to
sharing information between the private sector and the government3. Furthermore, while
experts within a particular infrastructure sector may be able to identify the interdependencies
within that sector to build a concise network model for analysis, it is a challenge to identify
the interdependencies between different sectors. Interdependencies are most often classified
into the following five types6,7:
•
•
•

•

•

Physical - A physical or engineering reliance between infrastructures, e.g. material
flow from one infrastructure to another.
Information/Cyber - An informational or control requirement between infrastructures,
e.g. a reliance on information transfer between infrastructures.
Geospatial/Geographical - A relationship that exists entirely because of the proximity
of infrastructures, e.g. a local environmental event affects components across multiple
infrastructures due to physical proximity.
Policy/Procedural - An interdependency that exists due to policy or procedure that
relates a state or event change in one infrastructure sector to a subsequent effect on
another sector, e.g. government’s emergency mandatory orders on a particular area
due to the influence of an event.
Societal/Logical - An interdependency that an infrastructure event may have on
societal factors, e.g. public opinion, public confidence, fear, and culture issues.

The challenging problem of modelling the relationship/network models of these complex
systems have motivated much research8,9. However, even if accurate models were built, it is
unclear if the far-reaching consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake/tsunami could have been anticipated. Very often, some interdependencies are
explicitly revealed only after the disasters or disruptions occur. For example, the Tohoku
disaster left over twenty thousand confirmed dead, injured or missing, and millions more
affected by lack of electricity, water and transportation10. Extensive agriculture landscape
was flooded, train stations and railway network were damaged, a dam failed in operation, fire
occurred at an oil refinery plant, electricity transmission lines, ship and crane, highway
bridges were damaged, and a level-7 nuclear accident happened at the Fukushima nuclear
power plant11. Also affected were the interrelated supply chain business networks between
Japan and other countries. To cooperate with electricity conservation efforts, many factories
producing high technology components stopped production lines to support blackout
measures.
The idea that such high impact but highly unexpected events could actually have been
expected if the relevant available data had been accounted for was put forth by Taleb12 in his
book “The Black Swan”. Black Swan events are highly improbable events (outliers), and
highly impactful, and can be caused and exacerbated by their being unexpected. However, in
spite of being highly unexpected, it is natural that experts (and even casual observers) will
retrospectively be able to construct explanations for their occurrence after they have
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occurred, making them explainable and expected. In the context of critical infrastructure, this
is similar to the interdependencies that are explicitly revealed only after major disruptions.
As an example used by Taleb, the 9/11 attacks was an event that was a surprise to many
observers with major impact/effects felt up to today on the heightened level of security and
pre-emptive strikes against various parties. It is doubtful if any amount of modelling and
analysis could have predicted how terrorist attacks on some commercial infrastructure could
have led to the consequential shutdown of air-space, disruption of air travel around the world
and the ensuing conflicts. It seems to imply how little our understanding of the complex
systems in our society and physical world can help us guess what is going to happen next,
and this Black Swan logic actually makes what we don’t know far more relevant than what
we do know.
Since it is a challenge to construct an accurate model of the network of critical
infrastructure interdependencies/relationships and, anyway, our current limited awareness of
the relationships may not be helpful to predict the highly improbable and high impact
disruptions, it may be futile to go on to perform the required analyses on such models to
predict the effects of those major disruptions. Hence, instead of analyzing a given
infrastructure network to determine the effects of any failure, the overall aim should perhaps
be to solve the inverse problem, i.e. to synthesize the network that will result in the most
extreme disruptions due to some failure. This can be achieved by beginning with the set of
infrastructure components, their known interdependencies and prescribed initial/boundary
conditions and failure modes, and then apply optimization techniques to iteratively
vary/modify the network with additional (unforeseen) interdependencies until the disruption
effects are maximized. In this way, what is obtained will be a set of network models (with
their associated interdependencies) that can potentially be realized in our real world and that
will result in the most severe disruption effects due to various failures with associated
probabilities. The resulting networks obtained can then be reviewed by a diverse team of
experts to interpret the unforeseen interdependencies and potential scenarios that may lead to
the realization of the disruptions computed for the network. As both the severity/impact of
the disruptions and the probabilities of occurrence will both be computed as the criteria for
the optimization, this represents a risk analysis approach of describing the problem and also a
multiobjective optimization problem. Based on these ideas, this paper presents one way to
investigate how the highly unexpected major disruptions (the Black Swan events) in our
critical infrastructure systems can be anticipated by solving the inverse (optimization)
problem of synthesizing infrastructure network interdependency models for extreme failure
impact and probabilities. By investigating how the inverse problem can be formulated, the
study in turn also explores the bounds (limits) of these extreme (catastrophic) disruptions that
can arise from the interdependencies inherent in our critical infrastructures.
II.

Optimization and Analysis of Infrastructure Network Disruptions

The network model of critical infrastructures comprises the infrastructure
assets/components (nodes) and the links representing their interdependencies, as illustrated in
Figure 1(a) (for only three infrastructure sectors).
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Figure 1. (a) Critical infrastructure network model (b) Pareto optimal solutions of the
multiobjective evolutionary optimization problem, with network solutions of extreme
disruption representing Black Swan events.

The study of the critical infrastructure vulnerabilities is based on a risk analysis
framework, where risk can be defined as risk = f (probability, impact), i.e. as a function of the
probability of a failure/hazard/threat resulting in an adverse event and the severity/impact of
that event13,14,15,16. In the context of our problem, impact refers to the magnitude of the
disruption in the network computed according to various metrics used in network theory such
as, e.g. the giant component size17,18, using agent-based simulation19,20,21,22. Probability refers
to the probability of the failures propagating/leading to the disruption. The optimization
problem is therefore a problem of searching for networks and failures that maximize the two
objectives of probability and disruption, with the decision variables being the unforeseen
(variable) interdependencies and failure points within the network. With two objectives, an
evolutionary algorithm23,24 is used to iterate a population of solutions (i.e. a set of networks
with corresponding failures) converging towards Pareto-optimality. In this way, optimization
has been used to synthesize networks with the highest risk, while those with the extreme
disruption impact can be considered the Black Swan events, as summarized in Figure 1(b).
III.

Results from Experimental Case Study

The proposed methodology was applied to an experimental case study with a network
comprising 43 nodes with two variable (unforeseen) interdependencies added to the fixed
(known) interdependencies. The results show that unforeseen interdependencies can indeed
exacerbate the disruption consequences/impact, where impact is quantified by the giant
component size (the smaller the size, the greater the impact). The plot in Figure 2(a) shows
the optimal solution points obtained, with a line drawn through the Pareto-optimal solutions
to represent the Pareto-front. The point at the lower extreme left is the Pareto-optimal
solution with the greatest disruption (giant component size of 0.1), hence it can be interpreted
as a Black Swan event, and it represents the scenario where failure occurs at node 30 and
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where there are two unforeseen interdependencies as shown by the thick black lines added to
the network in Figure 2(b).

(a)

(b)

Figure 2. (a) Pareto-front of the multiobjective optimization of probability and disruption
impact (giant component size) (b) Network with two unforeseen interdependencies added.

IV.

Concluding Remarks

By assuming that a significant part of the network interdependencies is in fact unknown
(unforeseen), the proposed approach applies optimization to search for unknown
interdependencies and failure points that will cause extreme events, thus leading analysts on a
focused exploration of ‘what-if’ scenarios of high disruptive impact. In addition, it provides
policymakers with a way to analyse the ‘trade-off’ between the high-probability/low-impact
and the low-probability/high-impact events.
References
1

Clinton, W.J., “Executive order 13010 - Critical infrastructure protection”, Federal Register,
Vol. 61, No. 138, 1996, pp.37347-37350.
2
Lewis, T.G., Critical infrastructure Protection Homeland Security, John Wiley & Sons,
New Jersey, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/0471789542
3
Rinaldi, S.M., “Modeling and Simulating Critical Infrastructures and Their
Interdependencies”, International Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS '04 - 2004 Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences , Hawaii, USA, 5-8 January 2004,Vol. 2, 2004, pp. 20054-20062.
4
Dueñas-Osorio, L., Craig, J.I., Goodno, B.J., and Bostrom, A, "Interdependent Response of
Networked Systems", ASCE Journal of Infrastructure Systems, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2007,
pp.185-194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)1076-0342(2007)13:3(185)
5
Kroger, W., “Critical Infrastructures at Risk: A Need for a New Conceptual Approach and
Extended Analytical Tools”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 93, No. 12,
2008, pp. 1781–1787. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2008.03.005

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia
6

Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., and Kelly, T.K., “Identifying, Understanding, and
Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies”, Control Systems, Vol. 21, No. 6,
2001, pp.11-25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/37.969131
7
Pederson, P., Dudenhoeffer, D., Hartley, S., and Permann, M., “Critical Infrastructure
Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of U.S. and International Research”, Idaho
National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415, 2006.
8
Bagheri, E., and Ghorbani, A.A., “The State of the Art in Critical Infrastructure Protection: a
Framework for Convergence”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 4,
No. 3, 2008, pp. 215-244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJCIS.2008.017438
9
Yusta, J.M., Correa, G.J., and Lacal-Arantegui, R., “Methodologies and Applications for
Critical Infrastructure Protection: State-of-the-Art”, Energy Policy, Vol. 39, No.10, 2011,
pp. 6100-6119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.07.010
10
Japan Meteorological Agency, Report of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku
Earthquake, 2011, URL: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html
11
The
Gulf
Today,
Japan's
Afternoon
of
Horror,
2011,
URL:
http://www.webcitation.org/5xA4lpQXu
12
Taleb, N.N., The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, 2007.
13
Open Geospatial Consortium, Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative, Phase 2, 2002,
URL: http://www.opengeospatial.org/projects/initiatives/cipi2
14
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, Enterprise Risk Management — Integrated
framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, Chicago, USA, 2004.
15
Aven, T., Risk Analysis: Assessing Uncertainties Beyond Expected Values and
Probabilities, John Wiley, 2008.
16
Ferigato, C., and Masera, M., “Design of a Platform for Information Exchange on
Protection of Critical Infrastructures”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Critical
Information Infrastructures Security, Vol. 5141, 2008, pp. 337-348.
17
Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E., and Havlin, S., “Catastrophic Cascade
of Failures in Interdependent Networks”, Nature, Vol. 464, No. 7291, 2010, pp. 10251028. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature08932
18
Lam, C.Y., Lin, J., Sim, M.S., and Tai, K., “Identifying Vulnerabilities in Critical
Infrastructures by Network Analysis”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures,
Vol. 9, No. 3, 2013, pp. 190-210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJCIS.2013.054978
19
Brown, T., Beyeler, W., and Barton, D., “Assessing Infrastructure Interdependencies: The
Challenge of Risk Analysis for Complex Adaptive Systems,” International Journal of
Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, pp. 108-117.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJCIS.2004.003800
20
Dudenhoeffer, D., Permann, M., and Manic, M., “CIMS: A Framework for Infrastructure
Interdependency Modeling and Analysis”, International Proceedings of the 38th
Conference on Winter Simulation (WSC '06 Winter Simulation Conference, Monterey,
CA, 3-6 December 2006), 2006, pp. 478-485.
21
Bagheri, E., Baghi, H., Ghorbani, A.A., and Yari, A., “An Agent-based Service-Oriented
Simulation Suite for Critical Infrastructure Behavior Analysis”, International Journal of
Business Process Integration and Management, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2007, pp. 315-326.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJBPIM.2007.017756
22
Kremers, E., Viejo, P., Barambones, O., and Gonzalez de Durana, J., “A Complex Systems
Modelling Approach for Decentralised Simulation of Electrical Microgrids,”
International Proceedings of the 2010 15th IEEE International Conference on
Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2010 15th IEEE International

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia
Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems, Oxford, UK, 22-26 March
2010), 2010, pp.302-311.
23
Deb, K., Multi-Objective Optimization Using Evolutionary Algorithms, Chichester, John
Wiley, 2001.
24
Ray, T., Tai, K., and Seow, K.C., “Multiobjective Design Optimization by an Evolutionary
Algorithm”, Engineering Optimization, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2001, pp. 399-424.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03052150108940926

